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Abstract New generation electronic devices have become
more and more sensitive to the effects of the natural radiation
coming from the surrounding environment. These radiation
sources are cosmic rays and radioactive impurities, able to
corrupt the content of memory cells or to induce transient pulses
in combinational logic. The growing sensitivity seems to be related
to two main factors: the lower and lower charge needed to dene
the logic levels in advanced devices and the increasing number
of basic components inside the modern integrated circuits. In
this paper, are described state-of-art techniques to mitigate these
effects as well as typical tests to verify the radiation-tolerance of
the devices and/or systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Failure mechanisms induced in microelectronic devices as
the consequence of the radiation interaction are divided into
two classes, depending on the involved physical phenomenon.
First, the damage can consist in the creation of vacancies,
Frenkel defects, etc. in the Si lattice. This is the displacement
damage [1], usually related to heavy ions or neutrons.
However, in other situations, the damage is caused by
ionizing mechanisms and not by displacement. Gamma or X-
rays, ions, etc., create free charge in the integrated circuit (IC).
In some conditions, this charge can be trapped in the dielectric
layers of the devices (e.g., in the MOSFET gate oxide),
causing the so-called Total Ionizing Dose (TID) damage [2].
Obviously, neither of the damages excludes each other. For
instance, protons contribute to both TID and displacement
damage.
Sometimes, the free charge is created by a particle with a
high ionizing power in the presence of an electric field (e.g.,
in a PN reverse biased junction). Charge is eventually drained
out of the so-called charge collection volume where it was
generated, this phenomenon being equivalent to a short-lived
but intense current pulse that can modify the electric state of
the nearby elements.
This is the scenario where a single event effect (SEE) oc-
curs. These phenomena are characterized by the randomness,
both in the location and in the temporal distribution. According
to the kind of modification, the SEEs can be classified in
several categories although, in this paper, we will focus on
the single event upset (SEU), multiple bit upset (MBU) and
single event transient (SET), the description of other SEEs
being available in [3]–[9]. SEUs are the modification of the
stored information in memory cells or flip-flops, to which the
MBU is closely related since it consists in the simultaneous
modification of neighbor cells. Finally, SETs are transient
pulses potentially perturbing combinational networks.
Regarding the system level, SEEs can be divided into two
classes. Indeed, in some cases, SEEs lead to the destruction
of the device (Hard errors). A typical example is the single
event latch-up (SEL) [4]. On the other hand, the system may
just wrongly behave keeping its functionality (Soft errors).
It is important to remark that, in some cases, a soft error
can be as problematic as a hard one if it affects a critical
part of the system that would eventually lead to a later
fatal consequences (e.g., SEUs in the cache memory of a
microprocessor controlling a currency transfer: The computer
is not destroyed but there can be a significant loss of money).
Before going on the description of the SEEs, it is necessary
to define some useful parameters. First of all, the static cross
section, σ, is an estimation of the sensitivity to SEEs. In the
case of memories, it is the inverse of the average number
of particles needed to induce a bit flip in one cell. Thus,
supposing that the device has been exposed to a fluence of NP
particles with known energy and NEV events were observed,
then σ = NEV /NP . The soft error rate (SER) is defined
as the probability of an error in a device working at typical
conditions. Usually, it is expressed in FIT (Failures In Time),
equivalent to 1 error every 109 hours. For instance, 180-nm
SRAMs usually have SER values around 1000 FIT/Mb.
II. SOURCES OF RADIATION
In the past, radiation effects were a concern only for
applications devoted to operate in harsh environments such
as space vessels or particle accelerators so they were not
considered a critical problem for standard systems. However,
there are two radiation sources that can affect any kind of
electronic devices, wherever they may be: traces of radioactive
elements and vestigial cosmic rays, mainly neutrons present
in the Earth’s atmosphere [10].
A. Radioactive impurities in electronic devices
During the manufacturing process, traces of radioactive
elements can contaminate the production chain, the primary
source being usually unpredictable. For instance, in 1987 IBM
had to face a too high SER, caused by a contamination with
polonium, a non-natural α-emitter element. Finally, its origin
was traced back to the cleaning of some phosphoric acid
bottles with a 210Po deionizer gadget, in a factory far from
the point where the problem had arisen [11]. In other cases,
impurities came from an old uranium mine, laid upstream of
the creek where the ICs package factory collected the water, or
from phosphorous extracted from the dropping of bats living
in a cavern with uranium minerals [10].
Moreover, uranium and thorium minerals such as the pitch-
blende are geologically associated with the seams of tin or lead
ore. If the purification is not correctly done, tin and lead might
contain traces of radioactive elements. Thus, usual solder balls
become a source of α-particles. Fortunately, these particles
only travels some micrometers so a careful placement of the
solder balls as well as the use of ultra-purified metals would
avoid the disastrous action of the alpha particles, as it has been
reported in the literature [12].
B. Cosmic Rays
The second source of SEEs are the cosmic rays coming
from the outer space. Electronic equipment on board space
crafts is exposed to a shower of energetic particles (protons,
heavy ions, ...) coming either from the Sun activity or from
the galaxy core. Hence, SEEs have been the reason of some
fails observed in satellites [13]. Most of these particles are
repelled by the Earth’s magnetic field and only very few of
them reach the sea level. Unlike the exospheric cosmic rays,
particles arriving to the ground mainly consist in neutrons and,
less often, pions [14]. Indeed, only neutral particles manage
to escape from the terrestrial magnetic shield.
Even though they do not have electric charge, neutrons
ionize the matter by means of secondary mechanisms. Some-
times, the neutron hits an atom that immediately is thrown out,
this one being the ionizing agent. In other situations, nuclear
reactions take place. This option plays its most significant role
in the case of thermal neutrons, with too little energy to induce
an SEE but very likely to interact with a boron isotope, 10B,
with the release of a 1.47-MeV α-particle [15]. Unfortunately,
boron is very used in electronic devices since it is a typical
acceptor impurity and a component of the boron-polysilicon
glass (BPSG), used for metallization layers [16].
The value of the neutron fluence depends on the altitude,
latitude, sun activity and shielding materials. There is an
empirical law linking the neutron fluence with the altitude
[14] although, as a first approximation, we can accept that the
neutron fluence is ten times higher every 3000 m of altitude,
the saturation happening at 15-20 km at a value 100-200 times
higher than that at sea level. Concerning the latitude, a law was
proposed [17] setting that the neutron fluence is 5 times lower
on the Equator than on the Poles. Under these circumstances,
it should not be strange that New York City be usually chosen
as the reference point because of being at sea level and at a
latitude of 45, the neutron fluence being on the order of 15
n/cm2/h. Values at elsewhere are usually referred to this figure.
Finally, the neutron flux decreases in the periods of intense
Sun activity and if the system is protected by walls, by layer
of rocks, etc. However, this protection is not very effective
since a 1.5-m concrete layer reduces the neutron fluence only
to 1/2 of the initial value [18].
III. NEUTRONS AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES
One of the questions that can arise is why SEEs are now
a problem. In following sections, some answers related to
the decrease in the technology features (transistor’s size and
operating voltage) are offered.
A. Precedents of SEEs
In the early 70s, SEEs were observed in some satellites [19].
They were judged a scientific curiosity although, some years
later, their actual relevance was discovered. Something similar
is presently happening with the atmospheric neutrons. Years
ago, nobody believed that those exotic phenomena could affect
electronic systems operating at sea level. However, in the 90s
problems began to come up in aircrafts [20], where the neutron
flux is higher, and just some years later SEEs have become an
important topic concerning commercial electronics.
Obviously, the probability of a basic device’s undergoing an
SEE is very low. Nevertheless, in the case of either very huge
systems or a large set of equipments simultaneously working
throughout the world, this probability is not negligible. As
an example of the first scenario, SEEs in supercomputers
are illustrated in [21]. On the other hand, pacemakers, on
which a patient’s life depends and where the allowed error
margin is null, show the impact of radiation on largely-
distributed systems [22]. Another interesting example is that
of the computer servers and workstations [23], where massive
devices and very serious operations such as money transfers
are combined. Prior to 2000, sudden crashes happened in
UNIX servers, finally attributed to SEUs in the cache memory
of the microprocessors, oddly lacking error correction systems.
The replacement of the problematic chips could cost millions
of dollars [24]. A similar episode was observed on router
servers, which showed a high sensitivity to cosmic rays [25].
B. Reasons of this trend
In the light of the previous examples, the altitude where
SEUs affect electronic devices seems to decrease in proportion
to the evolution of the technology integration. In other words,
sensitivity is quickly increasing. Two factors are supposed to
be the reason of this trend: First of all, in spite of the fact that
most works in this field forecast a decrease of the sensitivity
in proportion to the scaling because of the diminution of the
charge collection volume [18], [23], [26], [27], it is also widely
accepted that the probability of MBUs increases as the typical
sizes goes down [28]. Nowadays, the ratio between MBUs
and SEUs are on the order of 1-2% [29]–[31]. Besides, other
papers predict a minimum at 100-200 nm followed by an
immediate and quick increase [32] although this opinion is
not widely accepted [18].
Finally, new generation devices are developed with the
purpose of profiting from their full potential. In this case,
all the estimations agree: if the probability of a fault in the
whole system is studied instead of that of an isolated cell,
the chance of an error is becoming higher as miniaturization
continues [18]. E. g., even though a change from an old to a
newer technology implies a reduction of the cell cross section
to 50% of the initial value, the number of cells may be 4 times
higher. Thus, the probability of an error, eventually leading to
the crash of the system, soars.
C. Factors increasing the probability of an SEE
Microelectronic devices can undergo a reduction of their
tolerance to the SEEs in several situations. First of all, the
sensitivity depends on the power supply values: the lower the
power supply value, the higher the probability of an SEU [27],
[32], [33]. Besides, other works have found a little dependence
on the temperature [34]. The clock frequency also influences
the SER value although some experimental results disagree.
Ref. [30] shows that this is secondary for some SRAMs but
other works concerning PowerPC microprocessors highlight
the importance of the frequency of operation [35].
IV. TECHNIQUES TO MITIGATE SEES
Prior to enumerating the different techniques to avoid the
incidence of SEEs, it is necessary to specify the devices where
the chance is higher. DRAMs, PSRAMs, ROM and NAND
memories show a high tolerance [18], [23], [36], the most
significant effects being forecasted in typical SRAM devices
(SRAM modules, FPGAs, cache memory of microprocessors,
etc.). SETs are expected to become a very important concern
in the range of 90-nm technologies and it will affect all the
logic networks, whether combinational or sequential blocks.
Three are the main lines to harden devices against SEEs:
Technology, Design and Redundancy.
A. Mitigation by Technology
Some technologies seem to be more tolerant to effects of
the radiation than others. Therefore, their use would increase
the tolerance of the IC. Some options are the following:
1) Removal of BPSG layer: In the 90s, BPSG process
became very popular since it reduced the Si stress during
the metallization. Unfortunately, this layer contains 5-10% of
boron, quite sensitive to thermal neutrons as it was previously
highlighted. In fact, devices without BPSG seem to have an
SER ten times lower than those incorporating this process [15].
Fortunately, technologies below 130 nm no longer make
use of BPSG [37]. However, if the chip designer must use
technologies with BPSG, there are still two tricks. First,
purification: in its natural state, boron is actually a mixture
of two stable isotopes, 11B (80%) and 10B (20%), so using
only 11B will inhibit the action of the thermal neutrons. The
second option is the boron shields. Chips can be covered with
a B4Si3 layer or their external packages be doped with boron.
Thus, most of the thermal neutrons will interact with boron
atoms very far away from the Si bulk, avoiding the daughter
α-particles reach the critical nodes.
2) Silicon-on-insulator (SOI) Technology: Some papers
have reported that SOI technologies show an SER several
times lower than that of the same generation bulk technology
[18], [38]. Nevertheless, partially depleted SOI technologies
are sensitive to a specific SEE, called snapback [9], [39].
This problem is solved in more modern fully depleted SOI
technologies with body ties, immune to this effect and showing
an SER 50 times lower than that of the bulk technologies [40].
3) Managing the doping prole: If neither the SOI tech-
nologies nor the BPSG removal are available, another option
is to implant a very doped layer below the internal devices.
Thus, the charge collection volume shrinks and the SEE is
dimmed. Usually, the sensitivity is reduced down to 25-50% of
that of a non-hardened device. Nevertheless, this choice brings
two drawbacks: First, an additional step is needed during
the manufacturing process. Moreover, parasitic capacitors are
added, dramatically worsening the frequency response [18].
B. Mitigation by Design
In these strategies, basic circuit cells are improved adding
extra devices (resistors, transistors,...) with the purpose of
dealing with the consequences of the single events.
Most of the works focus on SRAM cells. Such a classic cell
consists in a couple of two inverters, their outputs connected
to the input of each other. The first approach to mitigate SEUs
was to include resistors between the output and the input
of the inverters [41]. This is equivalent to add an LP filter
to the structure so the penalty is that the IC speed plunges
down. Many hardened-by-design structures were proposed in
the related literature, all of them being based on the addition
of extra transistors to provide a feedback and to restore the
memory cell content in case of an SET: DICE [42], HIT [43]
and other solutions described at [44]–[49]. These structures
have between 12 and 16 transistors whereas a usual cell has
only 6 so they have lesser integration capability and high
power consumption.
C. Mitigation by Redundancy
Previous techniques are based on a redesign of the ICs in
order to reduce their sensitivity to the SEEs. However, some-
times this is not a realistic choice since electronic equipment
developers usually rely on available ICs in the market (COTS).
In this case, are available some well-known techniques to
mitigate SEEs that can be implemented in commercial devices.
1) Error correction codes: Additional bits are added to
every word in order to detect and correct erroneous values
(e.g., parity bits, Hamming code, etc.). This technique is useful
to avoid SEUs on data storage devices such as memories. The
correction can be done by software (coding the data before
saving) or redesigning a new chip [50]. The drawbacks of
this technique are several: First of all, the effective memory
area decreases (e.g., a 64-bit word needs 72 cells). Secondly,
codes are usually able to correct only a single error but in case
of a multiple error the correction system fails (in previous
sections, it was stated that 1-2% of single event effects are
MBUs). Finally, if a SET occurs in the coder while coding or
decoding, true data words are corrupted.
2) Interleaving bits: This technique complements the pre-
vious one to reduce the sensitivity to MBUs. The principle
is simple: Given that MBUs affect adjacent bits, never should
data be registered in contiguous cells [23]. The main drawback
of this option is the dramatic reduction of the effective capacity
of the memories because of the use of ghost bits. Also, the
problem of fails inside the coder/decoder remains.
3) Periodical refresh and resetting: This technique is re-
stricted to some reconfigurable devices (FPGAs, CPLDs, etc.).
Sometimes, SEU can corrupt data that keep latent without
immediate consequences. Or, in other cases, the devices be-
long to a large set of similar elements where the damaged
device can be replaced by the unaffected twins (e.g., signal
conditioners measuring the temperature of a huge system). In
this case, a periodical reload of the source configuration from
a trustworthy copy erases all the internal errors. Moreover, this
technique is compatible with the usual updates of the internal
digital code of these devices.
Very often, an SEU can hang a microprocessor or an
FPGA so their outputs no longer change. In such a situation,
watchdog devices must be used to detect breaks of the data
stream. If no activity is observed for some seconds, the device
starts to provide reset digital pulses to the main device until
the watchdog detects again signs of operation.
Some examples of these techniques are found in [51], [52].
4) Triple modular redundancy: Usually known as TMR,
this technique is the most popular among the designers of
fault-tolerant digital systems. Instead of using only one system,
the designer implements three copies, their outputs going to
a voting system, which will perform a majority vote. Thus,
even if one of the copies completely stops working, the system
output keeps unaffected. Obviously, there is always the risk of
the crash of two of the three blocks although this situation
seems to be unrealistic due to the statistic laws.
The popularity of this technique springs from the ease to
implement the design in FPGAs. Indeed, there are some tools
to implement HDL (Hardware Description Language) designs
in TMR mode [53]. Unfortunately, the handicaps are that the
size of the system soars up to three times the initial one
so, sometimes, only critical parts such as the latches used in
sequential logic are triplicated. Moreover, even a TMR system
is committed if a SET occurs in the combinational voting
block. Finally, the speed of the system decreases due to the
addition of a new stage. Some representative applications can
be found at the literature [54]–[56].
5) Time redundancy: These techniques are based on peri-
odically sampling the output signal to detect transients due
to SEEs. Unlike TMR, this technique is mainly devoted to
minimize the action of SETs on combinational logic.
A simple solution consists in delaying the signal for TD ns
and comparing the original and the delayed signals by means
of a XOR gate. If a SET happens, the signals are not equal
and the system can be warned.
Similar topologies can be implemented although all of them
train the same drawbacks. First, if the SET keeps for longer
than TD, the system will end up believing that the anomalous
situation is correct. Also, in case of an ordinary change in the
input value, the warning system only accepts the trueness of
the new value after TD ns. Therefore, this strategy usually
leads to a limitation of the frequency of work. Examples
incorporating this technique can be found at [57]–[59].
6) Software redundancy: This technique is suitable to
harden microprocessors-based architectures and consists in
modifying the program running on the device to self-detect
the potential errors. This goal is achieved adding check and
correction capabilities [60], such as the duplication of data and
instructions, temporal redundancy, etc.
The main advantage of this technique is that it allows
hardening any kind of architecture having a set of instructions,
from a simple PIC to a cutting-edge PowerPC. Nowadays, this
technique was proven as being able to detect around 90% of
soft errors provoked by the radiation. However, the drawbacks
are quite obvious: First, the size of the program, which usually
is 3-4 times larger than the equivalent unhardened version.
Secondly, developing hardened versions of the programs re-
quires the development of automatic tools.
V. EVALUATING THE SENSITIVITY TO SEES
After designing a system supposed to be perturbed by
radiation, a mandatory task is to get experimental results
allowing evaluating the sensitivity to the various radiation
effects. Such a task can be accomplished by means of suitable
experiments such as life tests, accelerated radiation ground
tests, fault injection and analytical techniques.
A. Life Tests
These tests consist in exposing the tested devices to the
environment of the final application. Usually, the test platform
gathers a high number of devices to increase the total number
of SEEs and, this way, to obtain valid statistics. Their main
advantages are that the devices are tested where they are
supposed to work so the only actual and trustworthy results
come from them. Unfortunately, it can be a really expensive
option, due to the accumulated cost of all the samples, the
power consumption and the necessity of devoted facilities.
Moreover, usually a longtime (from several months to a year)
must elapse before obtaining accurate results [10]. A detailed
description of an experiment of this sort can be found at [61].
B. Accelerated Radiation Ground Tests
To increase the probability of an SEE, an option is to use
as many particles as possible. This goal is achieved using
different facilities such as particle accelerators, equipments
using fission decay sources like 252Cf or Th foils, and laser
beams. Only a few samples are needed although the test set-up
is more complex than that of the life tests.
Thus, in some hours, trustworthy statistical results can be
deduced and validated by repeating the experiments. However,
only experiments performed with particle accelerators are
suitable to investigate the consequences of SEEs for a large
scope of particle energies and a sufficient coverage of the
sensitive area. Fission decay sources are usually used to
validate the test platforms prior to perform tests in particle
accelerators. Finally, laser facilities are complementary tools
providing means to investigate the consequences of SEEs,
specifically SETs or SEUs, with the chance of aiming a tiny
surface and so dealing with likely critical nodes of the IC.
In the case of the radiation facilities, samples are activated
so they cannot be immediately handled after the test. Besides,
devices must be decapsulated in order to straightly expose the
silicon active area to the beam. Even, in some cases, flipped
chips must be thinned to allow back-side irradiation. Other
disadvantages are the differences between the radiation source
and the natural particles, whether in composition and energy
spectrum. Finally, only a few facilities exist in the world so
the experiments must wait until the facility is available.
C. Simulated Fault Injection Experiments
These tests are valid for microprocessor-based architectures
and FPGAs. Bit-flips supposed to be caused by radioactive
environments can be injected in the device by hardware and/or
software strategies. In this way, the behavior of the device
undergoing radiation-induced SEUs can be deeply investigated
avoiding of radiation accelerated tests.
One of the state-of-the-art strategies is the so-called CEU
(Code Emulated Upset), in which the bit-flips are injected as
the consequence of the execution of a piece of code triggered
by the assertion of a interrupt-like signal [62]. Both instants of
occurrence and location can be explored either exhaustively or
according to a random pattern . The expected results of such
experiments is the number of injected bit-flips leading to an
error in the native application. Such a result is usually known
as error rate, τinj = Nerrors/NInjected SEUS .
If the SEU static cross section is known, the SEU sensitivity,
also called dynamic cross section, σdyn, of the studied appli-
cation can be estimated as σdyn = σ × τinj . A great deal of
experiments have proved that such an estimation is very close
to real measure as well as that the strategy can be successfully
applied to advanced processors [63].
The main advantages of this approach are obvious: acceler-
ated tests give too pessimistic results as they count all the
errors even though they happen on unused memory cells.
Despite this fact, the complexity and duration of dynamic tests
lead to the use of static cross section as the final application
sensitivity. Proposed fault injection approach allows to obtain
realistic estimations of figures of the sensitivity and can follow
without cost the evolution and updates of the application.
Yet the drawbacks are also important. Some cells are not
accessible to the instruction set although they are susceptible
to undergo flips and should be explored. An alternate solution
is to perform fault injection using an HDL model, which is
not always available.
D. Analytical Techniques
This is an useful way to estimate the tolerance of an HDL
design to be implemented in an FPGA. Once the HDL code is
developed and compiled, it is necessary to create a gate-level
netlist to be downloaded to the DUT by the JTAG protocol.
However, this gate-level design can be opened and studied
with appropriate computer tools.
Thus, the action of the radiation induced bit-flips can be
simulated prior to the implementation and their final conse-
quences forecasted [64]–[66]. Also, this technique allows to
identify critical points to be hardened and, on the other hand,
those parts where hardening is unnecessary. This way, the size
of the final design is reduced.
The drawbacks of these techniques are that, in any case, the
DUT must be exposed to a radiation source to be sure of the
quality of the design. Also, there is not a universal kind of
gate-level netlist so specific tools must be developed for every
FPGA’s manufactures.
VI. CONCLUSION
Advanced microelectronic technologies allow the release of
more and more complex devices with a growing sensitivity to
the natural radiation coming from the space or from radioactive
impurities. Therefore, their reliability, dependability and secu-
rity is threatened although some techniques allow mitigating
the consequence of these phenomena. In any case, radiation
ground tests are mandatory to get a feedback about the soft
error rate and the potentially critical nodes.
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